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Fast IPv4 scanning has enabled researchers to answer a wealth of se-
curity and networking questions. Yet, despite widespread use, there
has been little validation of the methodology’s accuracy, including
whether a single scan provides sufficient coverage. In this paper, we
analyze how scan origin affects the results of Internet-wide scans
by completing three HTTP, HTTPS, and SSH scans from seven
geographically and topologically diverse networks. We find that
individual origins miss an average 1.6–8.4% of HTTP, 1.5–4.6% of
HTTPS, and 8.3–18.2% of SSH hosts. We analyze why origins see
different hosts, and show how permanent and temporary block-
ing, packet loss, geographic biases, and transient outages affect
scan results. We discuss the implications for scanning and provide
recommendations for future studies.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Fast IPv4 scanning has become a standard measurement technique
for understanding edge host behavior on the Internet. Popularized
by tools like ZMap [22] and Masscan [24], Internet scanning has
enabled hundreds of papers on service deployment [4, 18, 20, 31, 53,
57], outages [9, 16, 22, 32, 33, 47, 55], host liveness [7, 12, 27, 46, 56],
security weaknesses [14, 45, 60], operator behavior [3, 19, 21, 23, 41],
botnets [5, 39], and censorship [34, 49, 50], as well as helped uncover
new vulnerabilities [6, 8, 13, 29]. Yet, despite the technique’s recent
popularity, there has been relatively little analysis of its accuracy
and completeness.
In this paper, we quantify the coverage provided by single-probe
Internet-wide IPv4 scans and investigate how the network used for
conducting scans (“scan origin”) affects their results. We complete
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three trials of synchronized HTTP, HTTPS, and SSH ZMap +ZGrab
scans from five geographically and topologically diverse academic
networks in Australia, Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the United States
as well as from Censys [17] and Carinet (a popular cloud provider
that permits scanning). We show that origins miss 1.6–8.4% of
HTTP, 1.5–4.6% of HTTPS, and 8.3–18.2% of SSH hosts in a single-
probe scan—about twice the loss originally estimated by Durumeric
et al. [19, 22]. There are a confluence of factors that affect coverage,
including regional access restrictions, intentional non-deterministic
server behavior, dynamic blocking, extremely lossy links, and short-
lived, localized outages.
Most inaccessible HTTP(S) hosts are missed transiently in only
a single scan. Transient loss is unpredictable and highly variable,
but is not simply due to random packet drop. In almost all cases
when one probe is dropped, secondary probes are also lost. Factors
like topological distance, peering relationships, and geographic
boundaries are poor indicators for the transient inaccessibility that
origins experience. Destination networks rarely have a “best” scan
origin; in nearly one quarter of destination ASes, the scan origin that
had the best coverage in one trial will have the worst coverage in the
next, even for major providers like Google and Amazon. While it is
typically difficult to explain why origins sometimes experience high
lossiness, we uncover evidence of short-lived outages that affect
only a subset of origins and account for 14–36% of transient loss.
ZMap’s retransmission scheme fails to account for most transient
loss, but loss is easy to overcome by scanning from 2–3 sufficiently
diverse vantage points,which achieves 98–99% coverage ofHTTP(S)
hosts and minimizes variance (𝜎 = 0.08%).
Network policies also bias the hosts that each origin can reach.
Censys misses 2–13 times as many HTTP(S) hosts as our academic
origins, far overshadowing the hosts that are transiently lost. Most
of the hosts that Censys misses are in a small handful of large
providers, but ISP decisions also block individual scanners from
accessing large portions of some countries. For example, Censys
is unable to reach 27% of hosts in South Africa and 43% of hosts
in Bangladesh. Geographic restrictions also prevent origins from
accessing all hosts. Just over 1% of Japanese and 2% of Australian
HTTP servers are only accessible from within the country, and
more than 100 American networks—primarily belonging to small
financial, healthcare, and utility companies—are entirely inacces-
sible from Brazil. Regional policies do not materially affect global
results, but can skew analyses of specific countries and industries.
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SSH scans miss five times as many hosts as HTTP(S) scans. We
trace this discrepancy back to several large providers—most promi-
nently Alibaba—that dynamically detect and block SSH scanners, as
well as non-deterministic behavior in OpenSSH where servers will
probabilistically drop sessions after detecting multiple unauthenti-
cated connections. This protection prevents initial completion of an
SSH handshake with most missing hosts, but can be easily detected
and avoided with immediate retries.
Our results indicate that single-probe Internet-wide scans achieve
lower global coverage than originally estimated (96.3% vs. 97.9% [22]).
This result does not invalidate the methodology, and in most cases,
the increased loss will not meaningfully change research results
based on Internet scans. However, loss is not simply due to random
packet drop, as was previously suggested. The differences in hosts
and networks visible from different scan origins can bias studies that
focus on specific geographic regions or types of networks, which
researchers should consider when designing experiments. Most
missing hosts are lost due to transient network problems, which
are nearly impossible to predict, but if researchers need improved
coverage, they can achieve this by scanning from 2–3 diverse ori-
gins, scanning with multiple probes with delay between probes to
the same host, or performing multiple independent scans.
2 METHODOLOGY
To quantify the impact of network origin on Internet scan results,
we performed nine synchronized IPv4 scans from seven geograph-
ically diverse networks. We specifically completed three trials of
HTTP, HTTPS, and SSH ZMap+ZGrab scans of the full IPv4 ad-
dress space from academic institutions in Australia (University of
Sydney), Brazil (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais), Germany
(Max Planck Institute for Informatics), Japan (Yokohama National
University), and the United States (Stanford University), as well as
Censys [17]. For one trial, we also scanned from Carinet, a com-
mercial cloud provider that Rapid7 uses for Project Sonar [51].
We scanned from a single source IP address from all locations
except from Stanford University, where we performed two indepen-
dent scans, one with 1 IP (“US1”) and one with a contiguous block
of 64 IPs (“US64”). We were unable to scan with more than one IP
from other origins, but use the 64-IP origin to analyze the impact
of multiple source addresses instead of multiple scan origins. These
vantage points represent all continents except Africa and Antarc-
tica, as well as academic, commercial, and cloud networks. Because
we only scan from Carinet in one trial, we exclude the origin from
aggregate statistics unless noted otherwise. We refer to origins by
country name for simplicity, but we emphasize that origins are
affected by a congruence of factors including geographic location,
IP registration country, upstream provider, peering policies, as well
as IP and network reputation.
Not all of our origins have clean scanning reputations. The Aus-
tralian and German IPs have previously been used for individual
scans. The U.S. IPs have never been used for scanning, but reside
in a /24 network that commonly performs scans. The Japanese and
Brazilian IPs, along with their respective /24s, have never been used
for scanning. The Censys IP belongs to one of the company’s re-























Figure 1: IPv4 host coverage by scan origin (2 probes)—Each
origin sees a distinct set of hosts in each scan. On average, origins
scanning SSH will see 10% fewer ground truth hosts compared to
HTTP(S).
but it is part of the company’s published IP block. None of the aca-
demic IP addresses appeared on any public blocklists. We have no
history of the Carinet IP beyond confirming that it was not on any
public blocklists prior to our study.
For each trial, we run a ZMap [22] TCP SYN scan and immedi-
ately complete a follow-up application layer handshake with L4-
responsive hosts (i.e., hosts that respond with a SYN-ACK packet)
using ZGrab [17]. On TCP/80, we complete an HTTP GET /; on
TCP/443, we complete a TLS handshake using the TLS 1.2 cipher
suites in modern Chrome; and on SSH, we complete a partial SSH
handshake that terminates after the protocol version exchange. We
choose these protocols because they are well-known TCP protocols
that are frequently studied by researchers [19] and commonly used
on the Internet [17]. We start each ZMap scan at the same time
across all origins and use the same ZMap seed, which ensures that
all scanners scan the same addresses at approximately the same
time. Each ZMap scan sends two back-to-back SYN packets to ev-
ery destination IP address, which prior work estimates will achieve
98.8% coverage of listening hosts [22].
To ensure that scanners do not fall out of sync due to mismatched
hardware and to confirm that upstream networks can transit scans,
we completed a series of ZMap scans targeting 1% of the IPv4 space
in October 2019. These experiments confirmed that all origins can
scan at 100K packets per second (pps) and that there is no increased
packet drop aboveminimal scan speeds (i.e., 1,000 pps). We snapshot
a routing table from our U.S. scan origin at the start of each trial to
determine origin ASes. We use MaxMind GeoIP2 Lite [44] for IP
geolocation.
We ran the final full experiments on October 21, November 20,
and December 10, 2019. Each trial elapsed approximately 21 hours.
The maximum asynchrony we found in L7-responses was 2 hours
for HTTP, 15 minutes for HTTPS, and 12 minutes for SSH, which
occurred at the end of the trials when our Australia and Brazil
scanners fell behind the others. This appears to be due to slight
differences in server resources across origins as well as differences
in the number of hosts that timed out (and thus missed) for each
origin. Because connection timeouts require more time to finish
than a normal handshake, scanners that see more timeouts fall
behind other scanners.
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Figure 2: Breakdown of missing hosts by scan origin and trial—Censys is long-term inaccessible from the largest number of hosts
across all protocols. For other origins, transient loss accounts for the majority of missing hosts.
Limitations. There is no known ground truth for live Internet
hosts. We estimate “ground truth” as the set of hosts that success-
fully complete an application-layer handshake with any scan origin
in a given trial. We limit our analyses to hosts that complete an L7
handshake to reduce the impact that firewalls, middleboxes, and
DDoS protections have on our results. We acknowledge that we
are unable to detect hosts that are inaccessible from all of our scan
origins, but we are limited to organizations that allow Internet-
scanning and further wish to minimize the number of probes that
destination hosts simultaneously receive. We choose to scan from a
single academic location on each continent, as well as Censys and
Carinet because the research community relies on their published
data. As we show in Section 6, even this limited number of probes
may cause some hosts to drop or reset connections.
Our experiments are limited to three trials of each protocol,
spread over eight weeks, which may amplify noise caused by tem-
poral churn. This also precludes certain longitudinal statistical
analyses, but we believe our current data sufficiently demonstrates
the biases that arise from single origin scans. In addition, because
we do not have access to edge hosts nor the exact paths taken by our
probes, we are often only able to hypothesize the precise root cause
for inaccessible hosts. There are also inherent biases to scanning
from academic networks, but we focus this work on examining
the differences that arise from diverse scan origins that resemble
what researchers are likely to use in their own studies. Most cloud
providers do not allow scanning and many researchers use their
academic networks when conducting experiments [19].
Ethical Considerations. We take several steps to minimize the
impact of our experiments, as well as follow the best practices set
forth by Durumeric et al. [22]. We limit scans to a single perspec-
tive on each continent and limit additional origins to those that
researchers commonly rely on. We focus on a small number of pro-
tocols that researchers frequently study, and we use scanning tools
that have been tested and repeatedly used by prior studies. In all
cases, our scanners follow protocol specifications, and we immedi-
ately close connections once a handshake completes. We configured
an HTTP page on scan hosts to redirect to a single website that
explained our study. Rather than scanning at full speed, we limited
each scan to 100K pps from each origin and spread our experiments
over several weeks. We also synchronized blocklists by combining
the IP ranges that previously requested exclusion from any scan
origin. This resulted in the exclusion of 17.8M IPv4 addresses (0.5%
of public IPv4) from the study. During the course of our study, we
received exclusion requests from 9 organizations, which we im-
mediately honored and removed from analysis. The data used in
this paper will be posted to the Scans.io Internet-Wide Scan Data
Repository.
3 RESULTS SUMMARY
Every scan origin discovers a distinct set of hosts, as can be seen
in Figure 1. The six academic origins each see an average 97.2%
of HTTP(S) hosts while Censys sees only 92.5% of HTTP(S) hosts.
Surprisingly, Censys sees about the same number of SSH hosts as
Australia, Japan, and US1. No single origin consistently has the
best coverage across all trials and no single origin achieves greater
coverage than 98% of HTTP, 99% of HTTPS, or 92% of SSH hosts
in any trial. We show the detailed breakdown of results by trial in
Appendix A.
To verify that there is a meaningful difference between scan
origins, we compare the number of hosts seen (and not seen) by
each pair of origins per protocol using McNemar’s test and find
statistically significant differences (𝑝 < 0.001) between all pairs
of scan origins in all trials. We choose multiple paired tests over
Cochran’s Q test (the k-group extension of McNemar’s) since a
single differing origin can produce a statistically significant result in
the latter. We apply a Bonferroni correction to account for multiple
analyses on the same data set. The visible variation across protocols
and the clear differences between Censys, US64, and the academic
scanners in Figure 1 further suggest that there are a multitude of
reasons beyond random packet loss that contribute to the observed
differences. As we will show in the next three sections, these include
blocking and firewalls, geographic routing policies, and transient
burst outages.
To better understand the factors that affect scan results, we sep-
arate missing hosts across two dimensions: long-term versus tran-
sient and host versus network behavior. Long-term inaccessible
hosts and networks are likely lost due to firewalls or other filter-
ing behavior (e.g., networks that have blocked an origin or limits
access to specific geographic regions), or to a persistent lack of
connectivity between the origin and destination network. Hosts
and networks may be transiently inaccessible due to packet loss,
temporary routing issues, real-time scan blocking, or other transient
network outages. We analyze these categories separately because
they have different root causes and impacts on our results.
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We consider a host transiently inaccessible from a scan origin
when (1) the host was inaccessible from the origin but accessible
(i.e., successfully completes an application-layer handshake) from
a different origin in the same trial, and (2) the host was accessible
from the original scan origin in another trial. Hosts inaccessible
from a scan origin for all three trials are long-term inaccessible. We
label hosts present in only one trial as unknown since it is unclear
whether this is due to a transient issue, a long-term change, or if
the host went offline.
We further split missing hosts into networks and individual IPs.
We aggregate ground truth IPs by /24 and calculate the fraction of
hosts in each /24 that are accessible, transiently inaccessible, long-
term inaccessible, or unknown for each origin. We require that a
/24 have at least two ground truth hosts with consistent behavior
to be considered as a single unit in order to avoid attributing issues
that affect a sporadic host to those that affect an entire network. We
choose /24s as the unit to analyze as they are the smallest publicly
routable network and are often administered by the same entity [27].
We acknowledge that our methodology does not capture whether a
policy is enforced within the network or on all edge hosts on the
network, but we argue the policy remains a network-level decision
in either case.
Transient issues account for just over half (51.6%) of missing
hosts and nearly always affect individual hosts rather than entire
networks (49.7% vs. 1.9%), as shown in Figure 2. One third of miss-
ing hosts are missing long-term; the remainder are unknown. By
definition, the number of long-term inaccessible hosts remains rel-
atively stable across trials. Small variations arise due to hosts not
being seen by any origin in a trial. For transiently missing hosts,
not only do the missing hosts themselves differ across trials, but
transient loss rates also differ across both origins and trials. The
largest temporal change occurs between HTTPS trials 1 and 2 for
Australia (+275%). We discuss transient differences in Section 5.
4 LONG-TERM INACCESSIBILITY
A significant fraction of the differences in coverage between ori-
gins are due to long-term inaccessible hosts: 4M HTTP (6.8%),
1.7M HTTPS (4.1%), and 3.1M SSH (16%) hosts are inaccessible
in all three trials from at least one origin. 92% and 34% of long-term
inaccessible HTTP(S) and SSH hosts are unresponsive at Layer 4.
Much of this is due to Censys, which sees five times more long-term
HTTP(S) inaccessibility than the other origins. While blocking is
undoubtedly a major component, there appear to be other factors
as well. The two origins that have never conducted prior Internet
scans (Brazil and Japan) have nearly double the long-term inacces-
sible HTTP(S) hosts than three origins that regularly perform scans
from their subnet (Australia, US1, and US64).
Excluding Censys, about half (47%) of long-term inaccessible
hosts are inaccessible from only one origin (Figure 3), but there
are significant differences between academic origins. For example,
Germany exclusively misses over three times as many HTTP(S)
hosts as the other academic origins (Table 1). We also find that 5–10%
of inaccessible hosts are exclusively accessible from a single origin.
Australia and Japan each see more than twice as many exclusively
accessible HTTP hosts as other origins. In this section, we focus on
describing why different origins can only access a subset of Internet
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Figure 3: Long-term inaccessibility among origins—
Excluding Censys, nearly half of long-term inaccessible hosts are
inaccessible from only one origin.
AU BR DE JP US1 US64 CEN
Acc. HTTP% 23.6 10.2 6.8 20.3 1.8 33.8 3.6
Acc. HTTPS% 11.7 13.7 18.1 18.1 0.3 30.8 7.3
Acc. SSH% 10.0 4.4 8.0 8.2 1.0 64.4 4.1
Inacc. HTTP% 1.2 2.9 8.9 2.1 0.9 0.6 83.4
Inacc. HTTPS% 2.1 8.0 15.9 3.7 0.9 0.4 68.9
Inacc. SSH% 10.9 7.9 14.4 10.6 12.9 6.6 36.7
Table 1: Breakdown of origins responsible for hosts exclu-
sively (in)accessible from a single origin—US64 sees the most
exclusively accessible hosts while Censys has the most exclusively
inaccessible hosts across all protocols.
hosts on HTTP and HTTPS, and highlight SSH behavior separately
in Section 6.
4.1 Censys Blocking
Hosts that are inaccessible from Censys account for 83% of HTTP,
69% of HTTPS, and 37% of SSH hosts that are long-term inacces-
sible from a single scan origin (Table 1). Censys is also the only
origin where long-term missing IPs primarily belong to fully in-
accessible networks rather than individual hosts. This is not sur-
prising—Censys scans significantly more than the other origins (at
least 106 times more frequently in the past 6 months), and we ex-
pect some operators to block Censys. In total, 2.9M HTTP (5%), 1M
HTTPS (2.4%), and 1.1M (5.6%) SSH hosts are long-term inaccessible
to Censys.
The bulk of Censys’ long-term inaccessible hosts belong to a
handful of ASes (Figure 4). For HTTP, three hosting providers
(DXTL Tseung Kwan O Service, EGI, and Enzu) account for 67% of
inaccessible hosts but less than 4% of global HTTP hosts. HTTPS is
similar with 38% of long-term inaccessible hosts belonging to the
same three ASes, despite accounting for 1.0% of all HTTPS hosts.
More than 99.99% of hosts from DXTL Tseung Kwan O Service and
Enzu were inaccessible from Censys in all trials, while 90% of EGI
hosts were long-term inaccessible in trial 1, but became completely
and exclusively inaccessible by the third trial. Excluding these top
three ASes, Censys still persistently misses 1.5 times as many HTTP
hosts as the second-worst origin (Germany), and 1.4 times as many
HTTPS hosts.
While this is significantly more blocking than Durumeric et al.
previously estimated [19], Censys performs continuous scanning,
and the difference could be attributable to the business decisions of
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Figure 4: Distribution of long-term inaccessible hosts by AS relative to ground truth—Three ASes account for 67% of the long-term
inaccessible HTTP hosts from Censys. In general, long-term inaccessible hosts are more evenly distributed across ASes for other origins,
with several exceptions labeled.
only a handful of providers. It does, however, show that IP reputation
and previous behavior can have a significant impact on scan results,
overshadowing the differences due to transient loss that we discuss
in Section 5. Since the time of our initial study, Censys has changed
and increased the IP ranges that they use for scanning.
4.2 Academic Visibility
The single-IP academic origins in our study consistently miss an
average 0.68% of HTTP(S) hosts and 4.4% of SSH hosts. Germany
misses 1.1–3.6 times as many HTTP(S) hosts as the other academic
origins; about 40% of these are exclusively inaccessible to Germany
and belong to Telecom Italia, Telecom Italia Sparkle, and Akamai
(Figure 4b). Though less than 1% of Akamai IPs are inaccessible to
Germany, 36% of Telecom Italia and 46% of Telecom Italia Sparkle
are long-term inaccessible, 85% of which are exclusively inaccessi-
ble. Using the packet loss metric described later in Section 5.2, we
discover extremely high packet loss rates (over 40%), which suggests
that Germany experiences a persistent lack of connectivity to these
destination networks rather than explicit blocking.
Japan and Brazil are long-term inaccessible from more HTTP(S)
hosts than US1 and Australia, despite never having conducted full
Internet-wide scans before (Figure 2). Surprisingly, Brazil and Japan
are more than twice as likely to both miss the same /24 than either
of the individual origins alone. About 70% of the hosts that are a
part of the /24s inaccessible from both Brazil and Japan geolocate to
Eastern Europe, resulting in 1.4% of Russia, 12.2% of Estonia, and 3%
of Ukraine and Romania being long-term inaccessible from either
origin. The Eastern-European ASes responsible appear to all be
hosting companies or ISPs (e.g., SantaPlus). It is unclear why both
countries are blocked by these providers.
Brazil loses the most entire ASes: nearly 1.4 times as many ASes
as Censys and 6.5 times as many as US1 (Figure 5). About half of the
networks that block only Brazil are American health or financial
companies. This contrasts Censys, where 40% of blocked networks
are government owned and 22% are consumer businesses such as
Jack-in-the-Box (AS 46603). American businesses may block Brazil
because of the high number of Mirai infections in the country [5].

















Figure 5: Long-term inaccessible ASes—Brazil suffers from the
largest number of completely (100%) inaccessible ASes. We also
show the number of ASes that are at least 75% and 50% inaccessible.
We find no obvious relationship (e.g., shared upstream peers, own-
ers) among the ASes which only block Brazil. However, we do find
that 14% of networks that block all non-US origins are owned by
Tegna Inc., an American digital media company.
US1 and US64 are particularly affected by ABCDE Group Com-
pany Limited (AS 133201, a large cloud provider in Hong Kong), in
which 56K hosts account for 17% and 22% of long-term inaccessible
HTTP hosts for US1 and US64. Interestingly, the same 56K hosts are
also inaccessible from Brazil and Censys, albeit at proportionally
smaller fractions of their inaccessible hosts. However, in general,
long-term inaccessible hosts for academic origins are more evenly
spread among ASes than for Censys.
4.3 Increased US64 Visibility
US64 consistently has the lowest number of long-term inaccessible
hosts because several networks block all other scan origins. It is
clear from Table 1 that at equal scan rates, scanning with 64 IPs has
advantages over using just one. US64 exclusively sees 1.5 times more
HTTP(S) and 6 times more SSH hosts than single-IP origins do, and
consistently has the lowest number of long-term inaccessible hosts
on all protocols. We manually investigate the largest ASes with
hosts only accessible from US64 and uncover evidence of intrusion
detection systems that detect and block IPs with high scan rates.
For example, hosts from Ruhr-Universität Bochum (AS 29484) were
accessible from all origins for the first 2 hours of the trial 1 HTTPS
scan (the first full scan we conducted), but afterwards only US64 had
visibility into the network in all of our later scans. We confirmed
this behavior with network administrators at the institution. We
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>1M Hosts >100K Hosts >10K Hosts >1K Hosts
HK US GB CN RU ZA AR IT AT VE BD EC AM EE AL BF LY MN MW SD
AU 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.6 0.1 0.6 4.6 1.0 0.2 7.8 2.8
BR 2.3 0.8 0.8 0.4 1.8 0.7 0.2 1.3 7.9 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.1 12.2 9.9 4.5 0.2 0.1 7.2 1.1
DE 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.7 9.9 9.7 0.7 7.7 3.0 10.2 12.5 0.0 1.1 3.4 34.1 0.1 1.6 26.9
JP 0.2 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.9 0.3 0.6 1.1 7.7 0.4 3.2 3.4 0.2 12.2 10.0 37.9 0.7 0.4 28.6 0.6
US1 2.3 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.9 1.3 7.7 0.2 0.1 1.1 38.0 3.2 0.4 28.6 1.9
US64 2.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.2 5.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.7 3.0 0.1 1.9 2.0
CEN 9.8 7.3 2.6 2.3 1.7 27.0 5.2 6.2 1.6 2.9 42.9 17.3 0.3 0.4 5.9 37.7 16.1 30.4 28.7 13.4
Table 2: Countries with themost long-term inaccessible HTTP hosts—Coverage of countries can be greatly influenced by scan origin,
but a significant fraction of missing hosts are often due to a handful of major ASes; red indicates one AS accounts for the majority of
inaccessible hosts, orange two, and yellow at least three.
also observe similar behavior from SK Broadband (AS 9318), which
accounts for over half of the SSH hosts that are exclusively accessible
from US64. In Section 7, we discuss whether scanners should use
multiple source IPs.
4.4 Geographic Biases
The countries with the greatest number of hosts broadly account for
the largest portion of long-term inaccessible hosts from any origin,
simply due to their raw host count. We observe a high Spearman’s
rank correlation (𝜌=0.92,𝑝<0.001) between the total number of hosts
and the number of inaccessible hosts in each country (and therefore
also the percentage of total inaccessible hosts). Despite this overall
trend, coverage of individual countries can be greatly influenced by
scan origin, especially for countries with fewer hosts. In 50 countries
(or dependent territories), more than 10% of their HTTP, HTTPS,
or SSH hosts are long-term inaccessible from a scan origin, and in
19 countries, more than 25% of their hosts are inaccessible. Nearly
all countries where a scan origin misses a significant fraction of
hosts are composed of only a single or small handful of major ASes
(Table 2). Indeed, there is only one country (Libya) where more
than 30% of hosts are inaccessible and the majority of hosts are
not hosted by a single ISP. In the most severe cases, 43% of hosts
in Bangladesh and 27% of hosts in South Africa are consistently
inaccessible from Censys. In both countries, this is primarily due
to DXTL Tseung Kwan O Service blocking Censys.
While there is no clear pattern between the origins that have
the best coverage of destination countries, we do find that origins
typically have better coverage of hosts within the same country
than external origins do, albeit by an arguably insignificant amount
relative to the number of global hosts. We exclude US64 and com-
bine US1 and Censys to analyze the effects of geographic proximity
on exclusive access of hosts in Figure 6. In Japan, about 1.1% of
all HTTP hosts are only accessible from within the country. 40%
are located in Bekkoame Internet (Figure 7), a Japanese hosting
provider with 0.9% of all HTTP hosts. NTT accounts for the second
most with 29% of the exclusively accessible hosts and 11% of all
HTTP hosts in Japan. The long tail of other ASes is composed of
various Japanese cloud/hosting providers and university networks.
Interestingly, the United States contains the second highest number
of hosts exclusively accessible from Japan; however, 40% of these
hosts belong to Gateway Inc. (AS 132827), a hosting provider regis-
tered in Japan. This suggests regional restrictions that only allow
access from specific locations.
About 2% of Australian HTTP hosts are only accessible from
within Australia. Just over 80% of those are served by WebCentral
(AS 7496), a Sydney-based digital agency that is the ninth largest AS
in Australia by HTTP host count. While the vast majority of hosts
that are exclusively accessible from Japan geolocate to Japan, only
half of the hosts exclusively accessible to Australia geolocate there
(85% vs. 48%). Just under half geolocate to the U.S., Germany, Great
Britain, Netherlands, and France. We suspect that these may be
geolocation inaccuracies: 92% of the hosts exclusively accessible to
Australia but geolocate to a different country belong to Cloudflare,
which confirmed that the IPs are advertised via anycast. Cloudflare
also confirmed that these hosts accessible to only Australia are a
misconfiguration, which was resolved after our report. Curiously,
most hosts accessible exclusively from Brazil are in the United
States. About two-thirds of these belong to WA K-20 Telecommuni-
cations Network, an educational ISP in Washington State. The hosts
serve Brazil an HTTP page titled “Blocked Site” but consistently
drop connections from other scan origins.
We see no regional correlation beyond countries (e.g., Japan does
not see more hosts in Asia than other origins). While exclusive
accessibility from another origin can account for up to 20% of the
long-term inaccessible hosts for any specific origin, this does not
significantly impact the results of global scans. On average, only
0.17% of all HTTP hosts are exclusively accessible from a single
scan origin. We find similar regional access limits for HTTPS and
SSH, although to a lesser extent than HTTP. The analogs of Table 2
and Figure 6 can be found in Appendix B.
4.5 Summary
One third of missing hosts are long-term inaccessible. Much of this
is due to Censys, which experiences five times as much long-term
HTTP(S) inaccessibility as other perspectives. For Censys, blocking
overshadows transiently missed hosts, but for other single-IP per-
spectives, long-term inaccessibility is a relatively minor problem
that affects only an average 0.68% of all HTTP(S) hosts. However,
we note that while only a small fraction of global hosts are missed,
hosts are not uniformly inaccessible. The decisions of a small num-
ber of ISPs can cause scan origins to meaningfully lose coverage of
entire countries (e.g., 43% of hosts in Bangladesh are inaccessible
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Figure 6: Exclusively accessible HTTP hosts by country—Origins within a country typically have better accessibility than external
origins do. Dark green indicates hosts that are only accessible by scanning from within the country. For these, we additionally show the
fraction of that country’s total hosts that are exclusively accessible from within the country.
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Figure 7: AS Distribution of exclusively accessible HTTP
hosts—We identify the ASes that account for the largest fraction
of hosts that are exclusively accessible from a single origin country.
from Censys), and in some regions, certain sites are only accessi-
ble from within the country. US64 consistently misses the fewest
hosts because its lower scan rate per IP address prevents it from
being automatically blocked by destination networks, and may be
a technique that helps researchers maintain visibility.
5 TRANSIENT INACCESSIBILITY
The majority of missing hosts are lost transiently (i.e., in some but
not all trials). This short-term loss results in origins missing an av-
erage 1.4% of all HTTP(S) and 7% of all SSH hosts for double probe
scans. We simulate scanning with one probe by requiring successful
responses to both of our ZMap probes, and estimate that origins
miss 2.7% of HTTP(S) and 8.3% of SSH hosts in single probe scans.
As can be seen in Figure 2, there is considerable variance in transient
loss across both trials and perspectives. For example, Germany sees
5.3 times more transient loss than Brazil in HTTPS trial 1, and Aus-
tralia sees a 2.75 times increase in HTTPS loss between trials 1 and 2.
Two thirds of transiently inaccessible HTTP(S) hosts are missed
by only one scan origin (Figure 8). For about 40% of destination
ASes, the difference in host coverage between any two origins is
greater than 1%, and for 16–25% of ASes, depending on protocol, the
difference is greater than 10% (Figure 9). This loss affects all sizes of
networks and nearly 25% of transiently missed hosts are from the
200 largest networks where some origins miss tens of thousands of
hosts in a single AS. We show the ASes with the greatest transient
differences across origins in Table 3; all are within the top 100
ASes by host count. Beyond the top five ASes, a notable fraction of
affected networks are Chinese, which is consistent with prior work
that has shown that packet loss on paths to China is unusually high
and unstable [63].
1 2 3 4 5 6



























Figure 8: Transient inaccessibility among origins—Nearly
half of transiently inaccessible HTTP(S) hosts are missed by only
one origin. SSH hosts are more likely to be missed by more than
one.
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Figure 9: Distribution of differences in transient loss rate
among origins—Transient loss rates from different origins are
identical for half of all destination ASes, while loss rates can differ
by more than 10% for about 20% of ASes. The dashed line shows
the CDF weighted by AS size.
No scan origin consistently has the most or least transiently-
missed hosts, and 96% of transient inaccessibility is due to missing
individual hosts rather than entire /24 networks. There is no single
best or worst scan origin, but we do find that origins have distinct
characteristics in how and where they transiently lose hosts. Packet
loss alone does not account for the variability we observe. We also
find that real-time scan detection and blocking, probabilistic block-
ing, burst outages, and other transient connectivity problems also
affect scan results. We note that a significantly larger proportion of
SSH hosts are transiently missed, which we discuss separately in
Section 6.
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AS Δ(%) Diff Ratio
ABCDE Group Co. (HK) 62.1 144K 136
HZ Alibaba Adv. (CN) 7.8 128K 8.1
Akamai (US) 2.2 126K 15.0
Psychz Networks (US) 15.6 71K 21.2
Telecom IT. Sparkle (IT) 77.0 58K 2,167
Telecom IT. (IT) 13.3 53K 60.7
(a) HTTP
AS Δ(%) Diff Ratio
HZ Alibaba Adv. (CN) 20.5 145K 68
Akamai (US) 2.1 97K 37.8
Telecom IT. (IT) 53.7 57K 137
Telecom IT. Sparkle (IT) 66.7 51K 2,929
Tencent (CN) 25.9 43K 13.4
China Telecom (CN) 18.0 40K 8.8
(b) HTTPS
AS Δ(%) Diff Ratio
HZ Alibaba Adv. (CN) 20.5 145K 68
Akamai (US) 2.1 97K 37.8
Telecom IT. (IT) 53.7 57K 137
Telecom IT. Sparkle (IT) 66.7 51K 2,929
Tencent (CN) 25.9 43K 13.4
China Telecom (CN) 18.0 40K 8.8
(c) SSH
Table 3: ASes with the largest range of transient host loss rates—Large ASes in China and Italy are the most likely to cause different






































































































































































































































































(c) ABCDE Group (AS 133201, HK)
Figure 10: Transient host vs. packet loss—The fraction of transiently missed HTTP hosts and the estimated packet loss rates are not
correlated in ASes for which there is a wide range of transient host loss perceived by different origins.
5.1 Origin-Stability of Transient Loss
The origin with the best or the worst coverage of a destination AS
is highly variable and changes between trials. For about 23% of
ASes, the worst scanning origin in one trial will become the best
scanning origin in another trial, or vice versa. ASes with dramatic
changes are not limited to small organizations where a few dropped
packets can have a disproportionate impact. The three largest ASes
where the best origin drops to worst for HTTP belong to Amazon,
Digital Ocean, and Google. We show ABCDE Group (a large host-
ing provider in Hong Kong and the fifth largest AS where the best
origin flips to worst) in Figure 10c.
Fewer than 5% of ASes have a consistent best origin across all
trials. There is no consistent geographic relationship between the
origins that consistently provide the best coverage. There is sim-
ilarly little correlation between the origins with the least packet
drop and best coverage, likely because packet loss rates between
origins and best-origin-consistent ASes tend to be very low (<0.5%)
and random noise can change rankings. It is nearly impossible to
predict which origin will have the best transient coverage of any
destination network.
On the other hand, 10% of ASes have a consistently worst scan
origin. Australia is the worst origin for 72% of ASes that have a
consistent worst origin, with most lost hosts geolocating to Russia
and the United States (Figure 11b). Surprisingly, about half of all
Russian hosts belong to networks where Australia consistently sees
the least. For HTTP(S), over 90% of Kazakh hosts are also consis-
tently the worst seen from Australia. We emphasize that this does
not describe all hosts in the country that are inaccessible from Aus-
tralia; rather, they represent the fraction of hosts in the country that
are consistently the most likely to be missed by Australia. In the
ASes where Australia consistently had the highest transient loss,
the average packet loss rate was more than ten times larger than
the second worst origin. A similar pattern emerges for the coun-
tries that consistently have the worst coverage from Australia. For
example, Australia saw an average 4.1% packet drop rate to affected
Russian ASes while the next most lossy origin saw only 0.44% drop;
Kazakhstan saw 4.6% (Australia) vs. 0.39% (secondworst). This could
be caused by a consistently congested path between Australia and
these networks, but we are unable to pinpoint where in the path.
5.2 Impact of Packet Loss
Fast Internet-wide scanning is inordinately affected by packet drop
since scanners like ZMap [22] cannot distinguish between unre-
sponsive hosts and dropped probe packets. We estimate random
packet drop by counting the number of hosts that receive one versus
two of the ZMap probes. To reduce the effects of middleboxes and
hosts that deviate from the TCP protocol, we exclude RST pack-
ets, ignore duplicate responses, and restrict our analysis to hosts
that complete an L7 handshake with at least one origin during the
trial. This provides only a lower bound on packet drop because it
excludes cases where both probes are lost, but we cannot reliably
determine whether this is due to packet drop.
Globally, we observe packet drop rates between 0.44–1.6%, de-
pending on trial and origin. Australia has the highest packet loss,
which is unsurprising given that it is the origin with consistently
worst connectivity to the largest number of ASes (Figure 11b). How-
ever, there is only a weak correlation between the ASes with high
packet drop and the ASes with high transient loss within each origin
(Spearman’s 𝜌 = 0.40–0.52, 𝑝 < 0.001). In 55% of ASes with HTTP
hosts and 43% of ASes with HTTPS and/or SSH hosts, there is no
statistically significant relationship within the AS between origins
that experience the most packet loss and transient host loss. Because
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Figure 11: Consistent best and worst scan origins relative to destination ASes— Less than 5% of ASes have a consistent scan origin
with minimum transient loss. Australia is most often the scan origin with consistent maximum transient loss.
we only estimate a lower bound on drop rates and cannot assume
independence of drops [48], we are unable to give a reasonable
estimate for the proportion of transiently missed hosts caused by
packet loss without severely underestimating its true value. While
random packet loss undoubtedly contributes to transient host loss,
it is not sufficient to explain the variation in missed hosts among
origins except in extreme cases where origin(s) see unusually high
or low drop rates.
We observe significant packet loss to China from all origins, con-
sistent with prior work (3–14% vs. 5–15% [63]), but it is not the only
cause of transient inaccessibility. For example, there is a stable rank
ordering of origins with the best visibility of Alibaba, but there is no
meaningful correlation between those origins and the origins with
the lowest packet drop (Spearman’s 𝜌 = 0.18, 𝑝 = 0.44, Figure 10a).
Contrary to prior work [63], Japan does not have lower packet
loss rates despite its proximity to China. There is also significant
packet loss to Telecom Italia (AS 3269) from all origins except from
Brazil (` = 16% vs. 0.3%, Figure 10b). Telecom Italia and Telecom
Italia Sparkle are the two largest ASes where Brazil has consistent
best coverage, likely because TIM Brasil is a subsidiary of Telecom
Italia [62]. Germany has exceptionally high loss rates to these two
ASes. Censys has high transient host loss and low packet loss in
the first two trials, but flips to low host loss and high packet loss
in the third trial.
5.3 Burst Outages
Beyond random packet drop, localized temporary outages also cause
transient loss. To quantify how many hosts are lost due to burst
events, we analyze the number of transiently lost hosts per hour
for every origin–destination AS pair and look for bursts of inacces-
sibility. We choose an hour granularity as it is the smallest logical
time frame in which we would expect to see an average sized AS
(≈1,000 hosts) experiencing random uniform packet loss to lose
more than one host per hour. We identify statistically significant
bursts of transiently missing hosts by searching for outliers in the
noise-component of the time series that are two standard devia-
tions away from the average expected noise. To extract the noise
component, we subtract the smoothed time series—obtained by
a rolling window, which on average minimizes the average mean
square error (i.e., 4 hours)—from the original time series.
We find that 14–36% of transient loss, depending upon the proto-
col, trial, and origin, coincides with a burst outage. Across protocols
and trials, there is no consistent origin which experiences the largest
or smallest fraction of hosts lost due to transient bursts. An example
of significant bursty loss occurs for Brazil during HTTPS trial 3, in
which 8% of all transiently-missing hosts are lost in a single hour,
affecting 39% of scanned ASes, including Akamai and Amazon. In
general, 45% of destination ASes which contain at least one tran-
siently missing host across all protocols and trials experience at
least one transient burst loss that can be detected at the hour gran-
ularity. The majority (roughly 60% for all protocols) of transient
bursts within a destination AS at a given hour occur for just one
origin and at least 91% of transient bursts occur simultaneously for
three origins or fewer. Across protocols, Australia is always the
most likely to be the single scan origin that experiences a burst loss
event, accounting for 30–40% of single origin burst outages. There
is no temporal pattern of when these occur.
We also analyzed whether scan origins see variable coverage
based on the local time that scans were performed (e.g., do any
origins see decreased packet drop or increased coverage at night?).
We did not observe any consistent pattern for any of our origins.
5.4 Summary
Most missing hosts are lost transiently in a subset of trials. Tran-
sient inaccessibility is inconsistent and unpredictable, shifting dra-
matically between trials, even for large providers like Google and
Amazon. It is nearly impossible to predict which origin will have
the best coverage of a destination network—scanning closer to
a network does not improve visibility. While few destination net-
works have a consistent best origin,when there is a consistent worst
origin, this is nearly always Australia and is due to extreme packet
drop. Broadly, however, transient loss is not entirely attributable
to simple random packet drop—except in extreme cases—and the
networks with the worst visibility often have the lowest random
packet drop rates. We discuss the impact of scanning from multiple
origins on transient loss in Section 7.
6 SSH BEHAVIOR
While HTTP and HTTPS exhibit similar behavior, SSH has a unique
dynamic. Scan origins see 10% fewer SSH hosts than HTTP(S) (Fig-
ure 1), experience five times more transient and long-term loss
(Figure 2), and are less likely to be the sole origin that misses a
particular SSH host (Figure 3, 8). As we discuss in this section, these
differences are due to security protections specific to SSH.
Nearly 40% of long-term inaccessible SSH hosts for Australia,
Japan, and US1, and 24% of transiently inaccessible hosts for Cen-
sys, Germany, and Brazil are hosted by Alibaba (AS 37963, 45102).
Alibaba appears to detect single-IP scans two-thirds of the way into
trial 1 and immediately blocks the origins (Figure 12). Alibaba’s
scan detection is non-deterministic and blocks origins at different
times across all three trials. Notably, the network-wide blocking
behavior causes SSH hosts to respond with a RST immediately after
completing a TCP handshake. Alibaba is the only network that
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Figure 12: Temporal Blocking by SSH hosts in Alibaba Net-
works—Across all origins using only one source IP, Alibaba inter-
mittently detects scanning and thus causes all SSH hosts to RST
the connection after completing a TCP handshake.
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Figure 13: Scanning Probabilistic Temporarily Blocking
Hosts— Increasing the number of times to retry a failed TCP con-
nection increases the probability that a probabilistic temporarily
blocking IP successfully completes an SSH handshake.
sends RSTs for all hosts in the network when scanning is detected
and does so for only SSH.
Excluding Alibaba hosts, 57% of transiently missed SSH hosts
explicitly close connections by sending a RST or FIN-ACK packet
after the TCP handshake completes, in contrast to 70% of transiently
missed HTTP(S) hosts that drop the connection rather than close
it. This suggests that SSH hosts are more likely to explicitly deny
connection requests, but do not do so consistently. We analyze hosts
in the ten ASes that exhibit the most transient SSH hosts. We find
that hosts typically close the connection after the TCP connection
completes, but occasionally complete the SSH handshake. To fur-
ther investigate, we conduct an additional experiment from US1
in which we select a random candidate sub-network from each of
the top ten ASes in terms of number of transiently missed SSH
hosts. We iteratively scan all hosts in the sub-network while each
time increasing the maximum number of times we retry the SSH
handshake. By re-trying the SSH handshake, we achieve higher
coverage of each network (Figure 13). For example, re-trying the


































Figure 14: Further Breakdown of missing SSH hosts—
Probabilistic temporary blocking and temporal blocking due to
Alibaba contribute to over half of the missing SSH hosts. Probabilis-
tic temporary blocking affects all origins relatively equally, while
Alibaba only selectively blocks certain origins when scanning is
detected.
SSH handshake up to eight times results in successful handshakes
with 90% of responding IPs in EGI Hosting and Psychz Networks.
A Psychz Networks article attributes the non-deterministic clo-
sure to the OpenSSH MaxStartups host setting [52]: a three-tuple
that specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated
connections to the SSH daemon, the probability that a new connec-
tion is refused once the maximum is reached, and a strict maximum
of unauthenticated connections after which all connection attempts
are refused [61]. Increasing the number of consecutive SSH hand-
shakes increases the probability that the SSH connection is not
refused, as long as the maximum number of unauthenticated con-
nections is not reached. Notably, scanning from multiple origins
simultaneously increases the likelihood of an SSH host using the
MaxStartups property to reject the connection, as the number of
concurrent unauthenticated connections collectively increases.
To quantify the number of probabilistic temporarily blocking
hosts, we categorize any IP that closes the connection after a TCP
handshake with at least one origin and successfully completes an
SSH handshake with another origin as due to probabilistic blocking.
We estimate that this behavior causes the loss of 1.1M SSH hosts
(32–63% of missed SSH hosts across origins and trials), regardless of
the number of source IPs used. We further highlight that 30% of all
probabilistic temporarily blocking IPs appear to be long-term inac-
cessible. However, by repeating the experiment described above, we
confirm that the long-term inaccessible IPs are also probabilistically
blocked and only appear to be non-transient due to the probabilistic
nature of this phenomenon. We show a breakdown of the reasons
that origins miss SSH hosts in Figure 14. After accounting for prob-
abilistic temporary blocking and Alibaba’s scanning detection, the
number of missing SSH hosts across all origins becomes 2.2 times
smaller than HTTP and 1.1 times larger than HTTPS.
7 DISCUSSION AND LESSONS LEARNED
Themedian scan origin in our studymisses nearly twice the number
of hosts as Durumeric et al. originally estimated [22]: 96.3% vs. 97.9%
(1 probe) and 97.6% vs. 98.8% (2 probes) coverage for HTTPS. In the
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worst case, a single-probe scan from one origin only achieves 91.4%
coverage for HTTP and 95.0% coverage for HTTPS. This result
hardly invalidates the methodology, and fast Internet scanning
has provided sufficient coverage for meaningful contributions in
the security and networking communities (e.g., [1, 6, 8, 10, 13–
15, 18, 21, 28, 29, 37, 41–43, 50, 58]). In most cases, the increased loss
will not meaningfully change the high-level results of Internet-wide
scans. However, we emphasize that loss is not simply due to random
packet drop. The hosts that origins miss could bias results that
focus on specific geographic regions or types of networks, which
researchers should consider when designing experiments. Some
scan origins also experience more transient loss (e.g., Australia) or
long-term loss (e.g., Censys, Germany, Japan, Brazil) than others,
and researchers should validate the coverage when scanning from
a new location.
Multi-origin scanning. Transiently missed hosts are lost incon-
sistently and unpredictably. There are no clean results suggesting
that scanning topologically or geographically closer to a destination
reduces transient loss. Rather, transient loss changes dramatically
across trials, and our hypotheses based on topological and regional
distance, publicly visible peering relationships, traceroute results,
and packet drop rarely panned out when we manually investigated
individual networks.
Scanning from two origins helps considerably, increasing the
median single probe HTTP coverage to 98.3% and double probe
coverage to 98.9% (Figure 15). The variance experienced by pairs of
scan origins is dramatically lower than individual origins, which
suggests that scanning from any two sufficiently diverse origins
significantly improves coverage. At three origins, the median cov-
erage of a 1-probe scan is 99.1% and a 2-probe scan is 99.4% with
exceptionally low variance (𝜎 = 0.08%). Analogs of Figure 15 for
HTTPS and SSH are in Appendix D.
The combination of origins that provide the best coverage is
difficult to predict. Australia has some of the worst transient loss,
but the AU–US1 pair had the best overall coverage in our study.
However, when factoring out long-term inaccessibility, CEN–JP and
BR–CEN achieved the bestHTTP andHTTPS coverage, respectively.
AU–DE–US1 was the best triad, but the range of coverage between
any triad is 0.24%, which suggests that the exact locations may not
matter as long as they are sufficiently diverse. We emphasize that
the best combination of origins does not necessarily consist of those
that achieve the highest individual coverage. Rather, each additional
origin in a multi-origin scan should be diverse enough to maximize
the number of new hosts that become visible.
Origin Diversity. All of our scan origins were both topologi-
cally and geographically diverse, with the exception of US1 and
US64. To determine whether simply using multiple upstream transit
providers at the same geographic location provides the same im-
proved coverage, we performed a follow up experiment where we
completed simultaneous scans from three Tier-1 ISPs in the same
physical data center. In September 2020, we completed two HTTP
ZMap +ZGrab scans of the full IPv4 address space from our original
Australia, Germany, Japan, US1, and Censys perspectives as well as
from three hosts located in the Chicago Equinix CHI4 data center.
Each host peered with one of Hurricane Electric, NTT, and Telia
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Figure 15: Multi-origin coverage of HTTP hosts—A single ori-
gin scan provides a median 95.5% coverage of HTTP hosts. Scanning
from two or three origins provides 98% and 99% coverage, with sig-
nificantly reduced variability. This indicates that scanning from any
combination of sufficiently diverse origins provides high coverage
of hosts.
Carrier using a unique ASN and unique /24 netblock. The three IP
ranges had never previously been used for scanning.
In both trials, Hurricane Electric had the highest coverage of
HTTP hosts among all three providers and the five geographic
locations (98.1% using 2 probes). The triad of the three Tier-1s in
the same location (HE–NTT–TELIA) provided the worst coverage
of any three perspectives in both trials (` = 98.7%, single probe). It
is not inherently surprising that scanning from the same location
provides worse coverage than three geographically diverse data
centers. Equinix CHI4 is one of the major IXPs in the Midwest, the
three providers employ hot-potato routing policies, and they all
peer with other major ISPs at the IXP. Traffic to many destination
networks may utilize the same paths regardless of the first hop
transit provider (e.g., if the transit provider peers with the destina-
tion network at the IXP location). We note, however, that variance
among all 3-origin scans is low (𝜎 = 0.1%) even if the three providers
are collocated: HE–NTT–TELIA saw 0.4% fewer hosts than the me-
dian triad (Figure 18). The approach provides improved coverage
over a single perspective within range of other geographically di-
verse triads of perspectives and likely at a reduced cost compared
to deploying servers in multiple locations.
Multi-probe scanning. Sending two consecutive probes achieves
higher coverage than one (96.9% vs. 95.5%), but in almost every
case, significantly less coverage than sending one probe from two
separate origins. Sending one probe from three origins typically
provides better coverage than sending two probes from two ori-
gins, and requires less bandwidth. In more than 93% of cases where
at least one probe was lost from an origin, both probes were lost,
which suggests that multiple consecutive probes do not provide
meaningful resilience against packet drop—packet loss is simply
not uniform random. This problem can be partially mitigated by
delaying the time between probes in a scan as proposed by Bano
et al. [7] instead of sending probes consecutively. We encourage
organizations and researchers performing a significant amount of
scanning to consider using 2–3 vantage points. If researchers only
have a single vantage point, we suggest scanning with multiple
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probes with delay between probes to the same host, or to perform
multiple independent trials of the experiment.
Scanner Blocking. Blocking is more severe than previously es-
timated [19]. Before changing their IP ranges, Censys persistently
misses 5 times more hosts than the academic origins, far overshad-
owing the number of hosts they miss transiently. While 67% of
the hosts that Censys misses belong to only three networks, after
excluding these networks Censys still misses nearly 1.5 times more
HTTP hosts than the second-worst origin. Since the time of our
initial study, Censys has updated their IP ranges used for scanning.
We confirmed that scanning with a fresh source IP increased Cen-
sys’ coverage of HTTP hosts by more than 5.5%. Scanning with
multiple source IP addresses also appears to prevent some intrusion
detection systems from picking up on scans, and a single probe scan
from US64 achieves slightly higher HTTP coverage than a 1-probe
scan from CEN–DE (98% vs. 97.9%), but slightly lower coverage
than the median pair of 1-probe, single-IP origins (98.3%).
Regional Biases. We find evidence of regional blocklists and
allowlists. While there is no indication that the Japan and Brazil
IPs have scanned before, both exclusively miss tens of thousands
of hosts. Over 70% of lost hosts are located in Eastern Europe or
are financial/health-related business networks in the United States.
We also find that some websites are only accessible from within
the same country. While exclusively accessible networks are not
large enough to affect our global statistics, they may affect a mean-
ingful number of sites within a country. None of our scan origins
are located in countries known for maintaining separate Internet
infrastructure, and the problem is likely more pronounced in other
regions (e.g., China and Russia).
8 RELATEDWORK
There is a significant body of work that develops scanning methods
(e.g., [2, 11, 17, 22, 24, 35, 40]) as well as uses the methodology to
study Internet behavior (e.g., [1, 6–8, 12, 14, 21, 25, 28, 29, 41, 50, 54]).
Several past studies acknowledge differences between perspectives,
but do not directly measure the source causes.
In 2008, Heidemann et al. completed an ICMP census of the
allocated IPv4 address space from two U.S. locations; the response
rate of their two origins were within 5% of each other for 96% of /24
network blocks [27]. Averaged across each pair of our origins, we
find that 87% of /24 blocks achieve a response rate within 5%. This
may be due to greater geographic or topological diversity among
scan origins. In 2012, Durumeric et al. estimated that a 1 packet
scan achieves 97.9% coverage and 2 packets 98.8% coverage by
performing a series of multi-packet scans from a single origin [22].
We find similar, but slightly lower coverage rates at 96.3% coverage
for 1 packet and 97.6% for 2 packet scans from a single origin. Our
number is likely lower because the original ZMap work assumes
that packet drop is uniform random, which we show is not true.
Adrian et al. completed a similar measurement when estimating
coverage at 10 gbE [2].
Later, in 2014, Durumeric et al. completed simultaneous scans
of TCP/443 from two academic institutions in the United States to
measure the impact of operators blocking scan traffic [19]; they
estimated that 0.4–0.6% of HTTPS hosts are inaccessible due to
blocking. We find dramatically (8.5 times) more blocking of Censys,
likely due to their consistent scanning. They also do not explore
transient versus long-term host inaccessibility. Guo et al. discuss
the prevalence of ICMP rate limiting, which may affect some scans,
though all probes in our study are TCP-based [26].
There is also a large body of work that focuses on Internet cen-
sorship, which could contribute to the differences between scan
origins. Pearce et al. [50] performed DNS queries from geographi-
cally distributed resolvers to quantify DNSmanipulation in different
countries. Khattak et al. analyzed the differential treatment of Tor
users and note that the view of the global web seems to change
depending on where a scan originates, even for non-Tor control
nodes [34]. None of the vantage points we use are located in coun-
tries known for censoring access, andwe do not find that censorship
is a major cause of the differences between origins in our study.
Padmanabhan et al. performed a nine year longitudinal study
on the effects of weather conditions on host outages using pings
from 10 geographically dispersed PlanetLab nodes [47]. They use
multiple vantage points for redundancy but do not analyze the
differences between vantage points. However, they recognize that
hosts can be unresponsive to all origins, and correlate the probability
of such dropout events with various factors. Shavitt et al. measure
the impact of vantage point distribution on creating AS topology
maps using hundreds of DIMES agents, and use graph convergence
techniques to show that it can take up to 40 different vantage points
for the Internet topology to converge [59]. The authors also stress
the importance of distributed vantage points in active Internet
measurement infrastructure. Kliman-Silver et al. studied the impact
of geolocation on web search personalization [36]. Kumar et al.
considered the difference in coverage of IoT devices between in-
home and Internet-wide scanning [38]. Holterbach et al. investigate
the similarity between results from topologically different RIPE
Atlas nodes and find that probe selection can increase the number
of discovered IPs by as much as 25% compared to the default RIPE
Atlas probe selection, but did not investigate why this occurs [30].
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated how the networks used to conduct
Internet-wide scans affect their results. We showed that a single-
origin, single-probe scan sees about 96% of HTTP(S) and 84% of SSH
hosts globally. This is more than twice the loss originally estimated
by Durumeric et al. [22] and is not simply due to uniform random
packet drop. Host inaccessibility is caused by both transient and
long-term network problems. Transient loss is generally inconsis-
tent across origins, though some origins consistently experience
greater transient loss than others. While unpredictable, transient
loss can be reliably overcome by scanning from 2–3 diverse ori-
gins. Blocking of networks used for regular scanning is also more
pronounced than previously believed. We find that regional access
limitations can bias results, and that in several countries, the policy
decisions of a single ISP can substantially limit a scanner’s visibility.
To increase coverage, we encourage researchers to consider using
2–3 diverse vantage points, multiple source IP addresses, and/or
sending multiple probes with a delay between them. Overall, loss of
global coverage from single-origin scans remains low enough that
it likely does not change the high-level results of prior work, and
On the Origin of Scanning IMC ’20, October 27–29, 2020, Virtual Event, USA
Internet-wide scanning remains a powerful technique. However,
researchers should be cognizant of potential bias when scanning
from a single location.
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A GROUND-TRUTH COVERAGE
Australia Brazil Germany Japan US 1 IP US 64 IPs Censys ∩ ∪
HTTP
1 96.5% 96.5% 96.3% 97.2% 96.9% 97.4% 91.6% 85.9% 57,829,891
2 97.6% 97.4% 97.1% 97.7% 97.7% 98.2% 92.4% 87.6% 58,040,919
3 95.9% 97.1% 96.8% 96.9% 97.9% 98.4% 93.4% 86.6% 58,554,985
` 96.7% 97.0% 96.7% 97.3% 97.5% 98.0% 92.5% 86.7% 58,141,932
HTTPS
1 98.5% 98.5% 95.7% 98.3% 98.0% 98.2% 95.4% 90.4% 40,809,122
2 96.3% 98.3% 97.7% 98.1% 98.6% 99.0% 95.6% 90.5% 41,093,084
3 97.1% 97.9% 97.1% 97.5% 98.4% 98.9% 96.5% 90.7% 41,098,147
` 97.3% 98.2% 96.8% 97.9% 98.3% 98.7% 95.8% 90.5% 41,000,118
SSH
1 86.4% 87.1% 86.7% 86.6% 86.2% 89.7% 84.3% 72.1% 19,457,647
2 82.8% 88.7% 90.1% 84.6% 84.3% 91.7% 85.2% 70.6% 19,598,041
3 82.3% 88.3% 88.3% 81.8% 83.5% 90.1% 86.3% 69.0% 19,891,888
` 83.8% 88.0% 88.4% 84.3% 84.7% 90.5% 85.3% 70.6% 19,649,192
(a) Fraction of ground truth hosts perceived from each scan origin in all trials (2 probes)—No origin achieves full coverage of hosts, and all origins
agree on only 87% of HTTP, 91% of HTTPS, and 71% of SSH hosts. Each trial represents a snapshot of the protocol ecosystem on the day the scan was
conducted.
Australia Germany Japan US 1 IP Censys HE NTT Telia ∩ ∪
HTTP
1 96.5% 96.1% 97.9% 97.8% 97.5% 98.1% 97.9% 97.6% 90.1% 56,094,571
2 96.6% 96.2% 98.0% 98.0% 97.7% 98.2% 97.8% 97.9% 90.4% 55,934,190
` 96.6% 96.2% 97.9% 97.9% 97.6% 98.1% 97.9% 97.8% 90.2% 56,014,381
(b) Fraction of ground truth hosts perceived from each scan origin in follow up HTTP experiment (2 probes)—Hurricane Electric achieves the
highest coverage among the three providers and five geographic origins. Censys sees a more than 5% increase in HTTP coverage by scanning with a new IP.
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B LONG-TERM INACCESSIBILITY
>1M Hosts >100K Hosts >10K Hosts >1K Hosts
US GB CN FR NL ZA IT VE RO AR BD BO GR EC TN SD LY AM ZW GU
AU 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.2 1.2 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.3
BR 1.1 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.2 1.4 0.4 0.1 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 1.1 0.5 0 0.1 0 0.2 0.2 1.3
DE 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.7 9.0 7.8 0.2 5.1 0.9 3.6 8.7 7.7 7.8 21.6 21.3 11.7 0.2 0.4
JP 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.8 1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1
US1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0 0.2 0.6 3.8 0.3 1.6 1.1 0 0 0.1
US64 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.2 0 0.2 0.5 3.8 0.3 1.4 0.8 0 0.1 0
CEN 2.9 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.4 21.6 4.3 1.9 5.4 2.9 14.3 9.1 4.5 8.4 3.0 10.0 9.8 1 10.4 9.2
(a) HTTPS
>1M Hosts >100K Hosts >10K Hosts >1K Hosts
CN US DE – – KR IT PL HK AU BD ZA PT CO PE LY ZW TN SD SN
AU 14.5 4.6 1.4 – – 14.6 5.7 1.6 7.4 0.4 10.6 5.8 3.7 1.2 1.1 2.0 2.3 1.9 1.3 1.9
BR 1.4 4.6 1.3 – – 12.8 12.2 1.9 4.5 2.8 5.1 5.5 3.5 7.0 0.4 0.1 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.4
DE 1.3 4.7 2.5 – – 11.0 10.6 9.0 4.0 2.7 7.9 4.9 3.6 8.6 9.5 33.1 0.5 17.2 14.1 13.2
JP 15.7 4.7 2.9 – – 12.1 13.3 2.1 6.4 2.3 7.0 4.4 3.8 4.4 0.6 0.1 0.8 3.5 0.4 0.3
US1 14.6 5.0 2.9 – – 11.9 12.6 1.8 7.3 2.3 4.8 4.1 3.6 9.6 0.6 2.9 1.1 3.4 0.3 0.3
US64 1.3 3.6 2.3 – – 0.3 0.9 0.7 4.0 2.2 4.2 3.1 0.6 8.6 0.4 2.2 0.8 3.5 0.1 0.3
CEN 3.5 8.5 3.2 – – 13.2 13.2 1.9 6.4 4.5 37.1 13.1 12.5 1.7 3.4 11.7 17.6 8.8 5.8 3.6
(b) SSH
Table 5: Countries with the most long-term inaccessible hosts—Coverage of countries can be greatly influenced by scan origin, but a
significant fraction of missing hosts are often due to a handful of major ASes; red indicates majority inaccessible from one AS, orange two,
and yellow for at least three.
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C EXCLUSIVE ACCESSIBILITY
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Figure 16: Exclusively accessible hosts by country—Origins within a country typically have better accessibility than external origins
do. Dark green indicates hosts that are only accessible by scanning from within the country. For these, we additionally show the fraction of
that country’s total hosts that are exclusively accessible from within the country.
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D MULTI-ORIGIN COVERAGE
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Figure 17: Multi-origin coverage—Scanning from three or more origins increases HTTPS coverage by 2–3% over a single origin. SSH
requires many more origins to achieve the same coverage, likely due to probabilistic temporary blocking (Section 6).
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Figure 18: Multi-origin coverage in follow up HTTP experiment—The HE-NTT-TELIA triad, collocated in the same data center,
achieves the worst coverage of any three origins.
